Moral Hazard Testing (Risk Transfer Behavior) in the Deposit Insurance System Based on Fair Premium for Determining Coverage Limit

This research tries to answer a problem that commonly rises in the Deposit Insurance system which is still new, the right value of coverage limit for the Deposit Insurance system in Indonesia. The coverage limit which is too high will encourage moral hazard from the IDIC banks to the IDIC, while the...

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Main Author: Firman Pribadi, Eduardus Tandelilin, Suad Husnan, Manduh M. Hanafi
Format: Proceeding
Language: Bahasa Inggris
Published: FEB Publication Office 2015
Subjects:
Online Access: http://oaipmh-jogjalib.umy.ac.idkatalog.php?opo=lihatDetilKatalog&id=64219
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spelling oai:lib.umy.ac.id:642192021-06-16T13:08:06ZMoral Hazard Testing (Risk Transfer Behavior) in the Deposit Insurance System Based on Fair Premium for Determining Coverage LimitFirman Pribadi, Eduardus Tandelilin, Suad Husnan, Manduh M. HanafiIDIC, Moral Hazard, Deposit InsuranceThis research tries to answer a problem that commonly rises in the Deposit Insurance system which is still new, the right value of coverage limit for the Deposit Insurance system in Indonesia. The coverage limit which is too high will encourage moral hazard from the IDIC banks to the IDIC, while the coverage limit which is too low can affect the stability of the financial system of a country. The results of the study show that the coverage limit of IDR 100 million per account and 1 billion per account indicates the occurrence of moral hazard from the banks of the IDIC to the IDIC. However, the results also show that the encouragement toward moral hazard behavior from the banks of the IDIC to the IDIC is not too big when the coverage limit is up to IDR 100 million per account. Thus, the results and the model of this research can be used as a consideration by the Deposit Insurance agency (LPS) in determining the optimal coverage limitFEB Publication Office2015Proceeding-Bahasa Inggrishttp://oaipmh-jogjalib.umy.ac.idkatalog.php?opo=lihatDetilKatalog&id=64219
institution Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
collection Perpustakaan Yogyakarta
language Bahasa Inggris
topic IDIC, Moral Hazard, Deposit Insurance
spellingShingle IDIC, Moral Hazard, Deposit Insurance
Firman Pribadi, Eduardus Tandelilin, Suad Husnan, Manduh M. Hanafi
Moral Hazard Testing (Risk Transfer Behavior) in the Deposit Insurance System Based on Fair Premium for Determining Coverage Limit
description This research tries to answer a problem that commonly rises in the Deposit Insurance system which is still new, the right value of coverage limit for the Deposit Insurance system in Indonesia. The coverage limit which is too high will encourage moral hazard from the IDIC banks to the IDIC, while the coverage limit which is too low can affect the stability of the financial system of a country. The results of the study show that the coverage limit of IDR 100 million per account and 1 billion per account indicates the occurrence of moral hazard from the banks of the IDIC to the IDIC. However, the results also show that the encouragement toward moral hazard behavior from the banks of the IDIC to the IDIC is not too big when the coverage limit is up to IDR 100 million per account. Thus, the results and the model of this research can be used as a consideration by the Deposit Insurance agency (LPS) in determining the optimal coverage limit
format Proceeding
author Firman Pribadi, Eduardus Tandelilin, Suad Husnan, Manduh M. Hanafi
author_sort Firman Pribadi, Eduardus Tandelilin, Suad Husnan, Manduh M. Hanafi
title Moral Hazard Testing (Risk Transfer Behavior) in the Deposit Insurance System Based on Fair Premium for Determining Coverage Limit
title_short Moral Hazard Testing (Risk Transfer Behavior) in the Deposit Insurance System Based on Fair Premium for Determining Coverage Limit
title_full Moral Hazard Testing (Risk Transfer Behavior) in the Deposit Insurance System Based on Fair Premium for Determining Coverage Limit
title_fullStr Moral Hazard Testing (Risk Transfer Behavior) in the Deposit Insurance System Based on Fair Premium for Determining Coverage Limit
title_full_unstemmed Moral Hazard Testing (Risk Transfer Behavior) in the Deposit Insurance System Based on Fair Premium for Determining Coverage Limit
title_sort moral hazard testing (risk transfer behavior) in the deposit insurance system based on fair premium for determining coverage limit
publisher FEB Publication Office
publishDate 2015
url http://oaipmh-jogjalib.umy.ac.idkatalog.php?opo=lihatDetilKatalog&id=64219
isbn -
_version_ 1702751116616269824
score 14.79448